This paper considers the well-known Levhari-Mirman model of resource extraction, and investigates the effects of the information structure of the dy- 
Introduction
The tragedy of the commons is one of the most readily accepted conclusions in economic analysis. In the abscence of clear-cut property rights assignment or in the presence of public goods, the emergence of the tragedy of the commons is almost always a foregone conclusion. In other words, a first-best outcome is typically not expected to prevail in such environments in the presence of multiple agents whenever their behavior is assumed noncooperative. Among the many diverse economic settings characterized by this outcome, common-property resource extraction is one of the most natural and most intensively investigated problem.
Of the several different competing models of noncooperative resource extraction 1 , the work of Levhari and Mirman (1980) remains the leading discrete-time model, and one of the most influential overall. Their simple model postulates two agents as joint owners of a renewable resource, with each of them maximizing the infinite-horizon discounted sum of utilities depending on own consumption only. An important feature of their model is that it reflects no market externality. They refer to the only interdependence in their model, the intertemporal common-property feature, as a "dynamic externality". Adopting the specific framework of log utility and isoelastic growth function for the resource, they provided a simple analysis of the Markovian (also known as feedback or closed-loop no-memory 2 ) equilibrium of the dynamic game based on a closed-form solution with linear consumption strategies. Their results confirm that, relative to the first-best or cooperative solution, the Markovian equilibrium leads to overconsumption (at every stock level 3 ) and to a lower overall utility level for each agent. Their model has recently been generalized by Fisher and Mirman (1996) to cover the more general case where there are two biologically interacting species of 1 In particular, the pioneering work of Gordon (1954) is one study that immediately comes to mind. See Clark (2000) for further references. 2 Henceforth we refer to this type of equilibrium using any of the three terminologies. 3 It is worthwhile here to fully specify what overconsumption means here: The resulting consumption functions are higher at every stock level for the Markovian equilibrium than for the first-best solution. Since this implies that the resource stock declines faster under the former regime than under the latter, actual consumption levels will eventually be lower under the Markovian equilibrium.
fish, and further extended by Datta and Mirman (1999) .
In a novel attempt to model history-dependent behavior in such an environment, Cave (1987) subsequently considered the symmetric version of this model and analysed "cooperative" equilibria secured by trigger strategies. In his setting, the two agents agree on extraction paths that mutually improve on the Markovian outcome, with reversion to the latter for the indefinite future constituting the punishment mode in case a deviation from the "cooperative path" is detected 4 . At any point in the course of the game, the players recall all the previous history of play: states as well as actions. Some recall of history is obviously necessary for the players to be able to monitor compliance with the cooperative extraction path. The equilibria thus derived have the desirable property of subgame-perfection, due to the equilibrium nature of the punishment phase. Ingeniously exploiting the rich structure of this framework, Cave (1987) provides a complete characterization of the associated large equilibrium set. In particular, whether or not this set includes a Pareto-optimal extraction path depends on a derived simple condition on the parameters on the problem.
The present paper is an attempt to understand the effects of the information structure of the dynamic game of Levhari and Mirman (1980) on the characteristics of the resulting equilibria. The main underlying question is whether a monotonic relationship exists between the level of information available to the agents and the efficiency properties of the resulting equilibria. We consider three different information structures, listed in order of increasing information for the players as open-loop, closed-loop no-memory (or Markovian), and history-dependent strategies. For the latter two cases, we rely completely on the results of Levhari-Mirman and Cave, respectively, as described above and in detail in the body of the paper. Our first task then is to investigate the structure of equilibrium under open-loop behavior by the agents: Consumption at any period depends only on the initial stock level and on the 4 While the idea that strategic interaction over time with recall of past play can induce more cooperative behavior on the part of players was well-established in the theory of repeated games, the economic applications of the theory of dynamic games (with a state variable) have generally restricted attention to non-history-dependent behavior. In this sense, Cave (1987) pioneered this type of analysis in economic applications of dynamic games. The complexities involved in such a task explain the specific nature of the model that Cave adopted, as will be seen below.
date. The agents are thus committed at the very beginning of the game to a fully specified course of play that cannot be altered along the way, as no dynamic information becomes available in the course of the game. The game may thus be viewed as a one-shot game with infinite sequences (of consumption levels) as strategies.
Our first main result is that the open-loop equilibrium coincides with the symmetric Pareto-optimal solution. While at first very surprising, we argue that this result is not so unnatural when one considers that the only externality present in the game is the dynamic externality. In other words, this result would survive an extension to more general functional forms for the utility and growth functions, but would not extend to a more general setting that includes a market externality 5 .
This finding, together with the results of the two previous studies, leads to the following assessment: Equilibrium efficiency does not depend in a monotonic way on the level of information available to the agents. Rather, efficiency as a function of information is U-shaped, with a maximum at the lowest information level (i.e. with open-loop strategies) and possibly at the maximal information level (i.e. with full recall of history), with a local maximum being guaranteed there, and a minimum at the intermediate level of information (i.e. with Markovian strategies). An intuitive account of this interesting conclusion is provided below, together with a detailed description of the general properties of each of the information structures at hand.
Besides shedding some light on the relationship between information structure and equilibrium efficiency in the specific dynamic game at hand, our results offer one policy implication worth exploring: If regulatory action could induce the agents to behave according to open-loop strategies in environments characterized by the sole presence of the dynamic externality, the resulting equilibrium would be a first-best outcome. A possible way of accomplishing this is to force the agents to submit a vector of specified consumption levels, over some fixed horizon, to which they would 5 In certain continuous time formulations of resource extraction models, the By contrast, the standard quota regulation is subject to unilateral violations since,
given the quotas assigned to the other players, the best response of a player is often to consume more than his own quota. Indeed, in practice, it has been observed in various settings that this widespread regulation scheme has enjoyed rather limited success.
For instance, the EU has on several occasions experienced violations by member states of the quota levels agreed upon within the Community. Another well-known example is OPEC, an international oil cartel that has frequently encountered major difficulties in ensuring compliance of the member states with their assigned extraction quotas, the explanation being again the unilateral incentive for over-extraction, given the partners' compliance with their quotas 8 .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
In Sections 3-6, the solutions under the three different information structures and the Pareto-optimal case are exposited. The main comparative results and their derivation, an associated discussion, with policy implications, form Section 7. Section 8 explores the relationship between the sustainability of the natural resource and the information structure. Finally, a short conclusion forms Section 9.
The model
Two identical agents share the rights to exploit a renewable resource over an indefinite future. The resource stock develops over time according to a biological growth rule given (upon a normalization of units) by
and this rule is common knowledge to both agents. Following Levhari and Mirman (1980) and Cave (1987) , the utility of agent i is assumed to be:
where c i t is his consumption at time t 9 . Let 0 < δ < 1 be the common discount factor of the agents. Agent i's objective is to maximize the sum of the discounted utility of
subject to
Upon specification of the strategies of the two players, the formulation of an infinite horizon dynamic game between the agents will be complete. Over the next four sections of the paper we compare the equilibria that arise under different information structures or, equivalently, under different sets of strategies used by the agents, in terms of their efficiency properties and their consequences on the resource stock.
This model is specific on two important counts. First, the utility and growth functions have special (though commonly used) functional forms. Second, the agents 
The Open-Loop Solution
In order to characterize the OL equilibrium, we begin with an analysis of the best response problem of agent 1 (say 
The first order condition for the maximization of the Hamiltonian is
The costate equation is λ t = ∂H/∂c 1 t , or
Since the right-hand sides of (5) and (4) are the same, we have
Rewriting (6) 
An analogous equation can be derived for agent 2 given a feasible consumption path by agent 1. Then invoking symmetry, we can postulate that c
t for all t, at an open-loop equilibrium. Furthermore, we can postulate -and later confirm -that the (symmetric) solution of (7) has a closed-loop or feedback representation g that is linear in x. Then pluging g (x) = λx in (7) and dropping time subscripts leads to
After simplification, we have λ
14 The associated second-order conditions hold, so the first-order conditions are sufficient.
x t , t = 0, 1, ...., this is the closed-loop (or feedback) representation of the symmetric open-loop equilibrium consumption strategies 15 .
A simple way to calculate the corresponding equilibrium value function V ol (x) for each agent (i.e the equilibrium total discounted utility given an initial state x) is to substitute (8) in the functional equation of dynamic programming (see Corollary 4 in Section 7 for a justification), yielding
and then postulating the 'guess' V ol (x) = A log x + B into (9), we get
Identifying terms leads to
where x is to be thought of as the initial state here. Under the open-loop equilibrium, the resource stock evolves according to the following difference equation
At a steady-state equilibrium of the resource stock, x, we have x = (δαx) α or
4 The Closed-loop (no memory) Equilibrium
Definition and General facts
A feedback or closed-loop memoryless strategy for an agent is a function γ from the set of all possible stock levels to the set of possible consumption levels 16 . Since with 15 Stating these strategies in this form is very convenient for the purposes of this paper, as this allows for direct comparisons with the other cases. The alternative, i.e. giving an infinite vector of consumption levels depending only on x 0 , would make this comparison less transparent. Thus we deviate from standard practice in formulating an open-loop solution in this manner. 16 With the above terminology originating in the control theory literature, the standard gametheoretic way of referring to such strategies is as Markov-stationary, see e.g. Amir (1996) . The such strategies, players are allowed to condition their extraction only on the value of the current stock, they necessarily consume the same amount of resource every time the same stock is observed, regardless of calendar time.
It is well-known that a feedback or Markov-stationary equilibrium of a Markovstationary infinite-horizon dynamic game remains an equilibrium when historydependent strategies are allowed. This also follows from the fact that with the rival playing a Markov-stationary strategy, a player's best-response problem is a Markovstationary dynamic program, which is known to admit a Markov-stationary optimal policy. Note in this case that this argument is equally valid in the presence of chance moves (i.e. stochastic transitions) 17 . Furthermore, an equilibrium in Markovian (or feedback) strategies is always subgame-perfect in a strong sense: Uniformly in the initial state.
The Closed-Loop or Feedback Solution
The results of this subsection are due to Levhari and Mirman (1980) . Their solution proceeds via backward induction to derive the closed-loop equilibrium as the length of the horizon is increased, obtaining the infinite-horizon equilibrium as a limit. Here, we analyse instead the infinite-horizon problem directly to maintain comparability with the other cases analyzed in the present paper.
A feedback strategy γ is feasible if 0 ≤ γ (x) ≤ x, ∀ x ≥ 0. We consider only the set of strategy pairs (γ 1 , γ 2 ) that are jointly feasible 18 here, in the sense that
Fixing a feasible strategy γ (·) by agent 2 (say), the best-response problem of agent 1 can be analysed as follows. Let V γ (x) denote the optimal value agent 1 can obtain when agent 2 follows the consumption function γ (·) and the initial state is
x. Then agent 1's best response strategy is the solution to the standard optimality latter terminology is more consistent with the way we defined the general class of games at hand, but is less prevalent in the resource economics literature. 17 It is of interest to observe that these important justifying arguments, as well as the so-called one-shot deviation principle, follow directly from the general properties of dynamic programming. 18 In other words, we are really considering a generalized game, in Debreu's (1952) terminology.
equation (note that subscripts are dropped below for the sake of lighter notation, as the identity of the agents is clear):
The first order condition is (g denotes the best response consumption policy):
We can clearly write
Differentiating with respect to x gives
Substituting (12) into (13) yields the envelope relation
Substituting (14) into (12), the Euler equation follows
Postulating a symmetric equilibrium with strategies linear in the stock, i.e. γ 2 (x) = g (x) = λx, (15) becomes
This simplifies to λ =
1−δα 2−δα
, so the symmetric CL equilibrium consumption is
This is clearly jointly feasible, i.e. 0 ≤ 2g cl (x) < x, for all x ≥ 0. The corresponding value function may by computed, as before, via the optimality equation (11) , upon substituting (16) for both agents:
Substituting the guess V cl (x) = A log x + B into (17) and identifying terms yields
The steady-state equilibrium level of resource stock satisfies x = (x − 2
Solving this equation for x yields
The Symmetric Pareto-Optimal Solution
In view of agents' symmetry, we focus on the unique symmetric solution out of the set of all Pareto-optimal outcomes. In other words, we consider as objective the sum of the two agents' utilities, as each is weighted by 1/2. This is clearly equivalent to the single-agent or monopoly problem:
The solution may be obtained from the previous section by setting γ ≡ 0. The resulting optimality, envelope and Euler relations are respectively
, and
Following the same method as before, the optimal consumption policy is then
and the corresponding total utility per agent is
The steady-state equilibrium level of resource stock is easily seen to be
6 The trigger-strategy equilibria Cave (1987) we find x t (h,
The present value to agent 1 for a given extraction rate vector h = (h 1 , h 2 ) is then
where Ψ 
where g cl is agent 1's equilibrium closed loop (no memory) strategy as given by (16) .
Given this, cooperative behaviour is closed-loop supported for player 1 if and only if
where the right-hand side of (22) (18) and (21) we have that a pair of extraction rates h ∈ CL if and only if (i, j =1, 2; j = i)
where By symmetry, it is now clear from (19) and (23) that there exists a Pareto optimal solution in the set of closed loop supported extraction rates if and only if
As trigger-strategy equilibria form an open set, there are also a priori uncountably many steady-state equilibra of the resource stock, x ts , all of which are clearly ≥ x ol .
We state the main result of this paper in the form of: Proof. We provide only an outline of proof, as the actual analysis was conducted in the previous section. (i) follows from comparing (8) and (19) . Total consumption is clearly the same in the OL equilibrium and the Pareto optimal solution. Hence, consumption per agent is also the same in the two solutions. Hence, the OL equilibrium and the Pareto optimal solution have the same total discounted utility per player. (ii) follows by comparing (16) with (19) and (18) with (20), respectively.
Clearly, total consumption in the CL equilibrium is higher than the Pareto optimal level while total discounted utility is highest in the Pareto optimal solution. (iii)
follows from the very definition of the trigger strategies used here.
Some important consequences of this Proposition are given next. The first compares the steady-state levels of resource under the different regimes (the obvious proof is omitted).
Corollary 2
The steady-state equilibrium levels of the resource stock satisfy:
Observe that Proposition 1 (ii) does not imply that actual consumption levels are higher at every time period in the CL than in the OL solution, the reason being that although consumption levels form a higher proportion of the current stock in the CL case, the stock gets consumed faster in the CL case, at least initially. In other words, under the CL regime, the agents consume a larger proportion of a resource stock that is shrinking faster or growing slower than in the OL regime. In fact, it is worthwhile to note the obvious fact that consumption levels are always unambiguously comparable at steady-state.
Corollary 3 Steady-state consumption levels are higher in the open-loop (or in the
Pareto-optimal) solution than in the closed-loop solution.
Proof. The result follows from a simple computation, the steady-state consumption levels for the OL and the CL solutions being respectively
While OL equilibria typically fail the desirable property of subgame-perfection, the present case forms an exception. Indeed, due to the coincidence of the open-loop and the Pareto-optimal solutions, and the subgame-perfection of the latter, we have:
Corollary 4 The open-loop equilibrium of our dynamic game is subgame-perfect.
We now provide an extensive discussion of our conclusions. The main result sheds light on the important issue of how the extent of the tragedy of the commons depends on the information structure of the agents in common-property resource extraction. shown to extend to general utility and growth functions and asymmetric agents, the trigger-strategy equilibrium is much harder to characterize at such a level of generality, as suggested by Cave's specific analysis on which we relied here. Aside from the latter difficulties, the main conclusions of the present analysis are robust provided the only externality at work is the dynamic externality.
The subgame-perfect property of the open-loop equilibrium turns out to be of possible practical relevance to a possible regulatory application of our analysis.
A Policy Implication
A natural question at this point is whether our conclusions offer any policy-relevant insights. Consider a government regulator with a mandate to prevent or limit over-extraction of a natural resource (such as fish or game) over a specified time horizon.
One possible way to proceed 20 would be to require the consuming agents to (independently and simultaneously) submit individual consumption plans over the entire time horizon with the understanding that they will remain committed to these announcements, and penalized for any future deviations. According to our analysis, if the dynamic externality is the only one present and if uncertainty plays no role in the context at hand 21 , this noncooperative mechanism would lead to a Pareto-optimal solution over the specified time horizon. This offers an interesting possible alternative to the usual centrally-negotiated cooperative solution consisting of allocating quotas to the agents, which is worth exploring. A key property of such a mechanism is that it would essentially be cheat-proof , at least in a unilateral sense, since if all the other agents employ open-loop strategies, a given agent cannot improve his payoff by following some more complex strategy, so he might as well do the same (this fact is an important property of open-loop equilibrium and was discussed in Section 3.1). Thus the monitoring regulator need only worry about deviations from the announced paths that involve more than one 20 There is an extensive literature on the regulation of natural resources via taxes or quotas (see e.g. Dasgupta, P. and G. Heal, 1979, and Bergstrom, 1982) . 21 Recall that, as can be intuitively expected, the open-loop information structure loses many of its equilibrium properties in the presence of uncertainty in the state transition law (see Section 3).
agent. This potentially makes the monitoring problem less demanding than in the case of regulation via centrally-allocated extraction quotas. Another desirable feature of this mechanism is that it is likely to be less demanding to administer, as it allows policy-makers to avoid the typically lengthy and strenuous negotiations that are often associated with quota negotiations 22 . In the language of industrial regulation (see e.g. Perry, 1984) , our proposal can be regarded more as an instance of structural policy than of behavioral policy. In other words, the aim of the regulator is to influence the strategic environment of the regulated agent by constraining his allowable strategy set, and not to interfere directly with the agents' postulated behavior of individual payoff maximization (taking the rival's action as given). In contrast, central quota assignment is an instance of the latter mode of regulation.
The notion that commitment is important in many classes of noncooperative games has been around for quite some time, and this is only a new instance (at least to us) of this general fact. 23 Yet, as simple as this idea is in the context of noncooperative dynamic resource exploitation, it does not seem to have been proposed before.
22 For resource conservation, the main approach taken by regulation authorities is to stipulate a total allowable catch for the whole fishery based on biological studies on the actual stock population.
Individual quotas are subsequently awarded, usually, to agents with a history of participation in the fishery (and through negotiations at the international level.). To implement a cost-effective fishery individuable transferable quotas are increasingly being used. Under this system total quotas being isssued are still determined by the regulation authorities, while trade in quota units is allowed so that they go to agents who value them the most. Such management systems of centralized control are used for most regulated fish populations. Clark (2000) provides a broad discussion of traditional and alternative fishery management techniques. 23 For instance, within the theory of multiperiod mechanism design it proves essential for the principal to be able to commit to a long term contract at the beginning of a relationship. In the opposite case serious ratchet effects may arise leading to substantial difficulties for contract theory, see for example Laffont and Tirole (1993 [chapter 9] ).
In this section, we elaborate on the observation that the differences in noncooperative
resource extraction between open-loop and Markovian behavior can in some cases be so pronounced as to lead to the long-run resource sustainability in the former case and depletion in the latter case. To this end, it is necessary to postulate another form of natural growth function, as (1) always leads to a strictly positive resource stock at steady-state, regardless of the information structure.
Consider the log utility function (2) and a linear growth for the resource evolution x t+1 = ax t , with a > 1.
Under the OL and the CL information structures, the same steps as before lead to the respective unique linear equilibrium (per-agent consumption) strategies The corresponding resource dynamics under the OL and CL equilibria is given respectively by the following two dynamical systems x t+1 = aδ 2 − δ x t and x t+1 = aδx t .
It is easy to verify, using the above equations, that under a moderate natural growth rate of the resource, i.e. Adopting the simple framework proposed by Levhari and Mirman (1980) , this paper has provided a comparative analysis of the effects of the information structure on the equilibrium extraction path and overall utility levels for a common-property natural resource. To allow a more intuitive understanding of the relationship between information and extraction paths, we derive all solutions using a dynamic programming approach. The main result is that equilibrium efficiency is U-shaped in the level of information available to the agents, with in particular the open-loop equilibrium being Pareto-optimal. We argue that the main result extends to more general functional forms, provided the special structure of the Levhari-Mirman model is preserved, with in particular the abscence of a market-type externality. This result is of broader interest for the application of dynamic games in economics, where similar information effects on the behavior and welfare of agents are often investigated.
The results suggest a mechanism design approach to the problem of regulation of common-property resource extraction: If agents could be induced to behave according to open-loop strategies, the equilibrium would be self-enforcing, and thus require relatively minor monitoring. This proposal would also save on the usual tedious bargaining and dispense with the reliance on truthful information revelation, two of the features that always accompany the process of quota-setting.
It must of course be clearly stressed that this novel and provocative proposition is valid only in rather special environments as reflected in the special structure of the model used here. On the other hand, there may exist other more complex environments where, for reasons similar to the ones driving our results here, the openloop solution welfare-dominates the closed-loop solution without satisfying Paretooptimality. Then, our proposed regulatory scheme would alleviate the tragedy of the commons without fully resolving it as in the present analysis. These issues would be important natural extensions for future research.
